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In the aftermath of June 2016 EU Referendum result the majority of attention has focused on what 
might be future economic relationship between the UK and the EU and the prospects fŽƌƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
trade relationships with third countries once outside the EU. None of the proposed models for the 
future trade policy relationship between the UK and the EU (for example, membership of the 
European Economic Area or a Free Trade agreement) come with a defined foreign and security 
policy relationship. Further, article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, providing for the exit of a 
member state from the EU, does not offer roadmap to a new status of foreign, security and defence 
policy relationship between the EU and its exiting partner. 
AƐĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ, extending beyond foreign and security policy, 
and encompassing a wider variety of areas including trade, aid, environment, energy, development 
policy, immigration, border, asylum, cross-border policing, justice policies are all currently 
intertwined with EU policies. Establishing the broad panoply of UK national policies across all of 
these areas will be an extensive undertaking. This article focuses on the implications of Brexit for the 
h< ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ? 
Security and defence policy gives effects to the broader foreign policy aims and ambitions for a 
state. For the UK the EU has been a centrepiece of foreign policy since accession in 1973. 
Consequently exiting the EU presents the prospect of a major rethink in the aims and ambitions for 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ conduct of British diplomacy and will 
impinge on security and defence policy (Whitman, 2016). The British Government has yet to outline 
ĂĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞǆŝƚ ?ƐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌdŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ ?Ɛ
hE 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ŝŶ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ŶŽƌ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ŽƌŝƐ :ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ  ?nd October 
speech to the Conservative Party conference provide sufficient detail on the objectives of future UK 
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ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĂůůŽǁ ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ ƐŽůŝĚ ďĂƐŝƐ ƚŽ ĂƐƐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ
security and defence policy (May, 2016; Johnson, 2016). 
 
The June Referendum vote can be read as facilitating the acceleration of a trend that was already at 
work in Government thinking. The two recent Conservative-led governments had already sought to 
re-ĐĂůŝďƌĂƚĞ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞ-ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ h ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛforeign policy. In a 
response to the rise of  ‘emerging powers ?  W as well as to shifts in the global political economy giving 
a greater prominence to China and Asia - the UK government was already placing greater emphasis 
ŽŶƚŚĞh<ĂƐĂ ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶpolicy actor, for whom the EU is only one network of influence. 
The current Government core strategy documents that guide h<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ
defence policy clearly demonstrate this position. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) ƉůĂĐĞ ƚŚĞ h ŝŶ ĂŵŝŶŽƌ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
defence and security.
1
 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐSingle Departmental Plan 
places the EU in a subordinate rather than a central place in British diplomacy.
2
 Whether it is now 
appropriate to revise the NSS, SDSR and Departmental Plan should be the subject of policy debate. 
 
As a nation-ƐƚĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ? ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ
defence policy has never been solely pursued through the EU but via a variety of institutions (and 
most notably North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations) and key bilateral 
relationships, such as that with the United States. Consequently, the detachment of thĞh< ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ƐŽŵŵŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇWŽůŝĐǇ ?&^W ?ĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶ
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will be less complicated than in other areas of public policy. 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ Ěŝplomatic and military resources will diminish the 
collective capabilities at the disposal of EU foreign and defence policies.  
  
  
The existing EU-UK foreign, security and defence policy relationship 
dŚĞh ?Ɛcurrent arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the CFSP and the CSDP, are 
conducted on an intergovernmental basis ?&ŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐŶŽƚĂĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ
treaties and only emerged as an informal process of collective consultation between member states 
in the early 1970s. Foreign policy coordination was revamped and made a constituent part of the 
European Union in 1993, with the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 
creating the CFSP and a commitment to an EU defence policy. The CFSP has the purpose of 
coordinating the foreign policies of the member states. It remains different from other areas of EU 
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policy as each member state has the ability to veto any collective decision, so policy making is 
normally described as intergovernmental, rather than based on the community method of decision 
making in which the European Commission proposes policy which is co-legislated by the Council of 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞ h ?Ɛ ,ŝŐŚ ZĞƉƌĞƐŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hŶŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), currently Federica 
DŽŐŚĞƌŝŶŝ ? ƚĂŬĞƐ ƚŚĞ ůĞĂĚ ŝŶ ƐƚĞĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŽŶ ďĞŚĂůĨ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĞŵďĞƌ
ƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞh ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌ  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ  ?ĂƐ ŝƚ ŝƐdescribed in EU-
speak), such as trade and development policy. To assist the HR/VP in her role there is the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The EES is a diplomatic service populated by European civil servants 
and seconded national diplomats. Whilst based in Brussels, it operates a network of EU delegations 
(which enjoy a similar status to embassies) in third countries.  
 
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐŽƵŶĐŝů ?& ? ?ĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?
defence and trade) ministers meets at least monthly to discuss and take decisions on common 
foreign policy positions, and to adopt measures, such as sanctions, to give effect to foreign policy 
decisions.
3
 The FAC is also responsible for taking decisions to launch crisis management activities 
under the CSDP ?ƐǁĞůůĂƐĐŚĂŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ& ?ƚŚĞ,Z ?sWƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞh ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
positions to third countries and conducts diplomacy on behalf of the member states. These member 
states appoint ambassadors to a Political and Security Committee (PSC) (chaired by representatives 
from the EEAS) which provide oversight of the day-to-ĚĂǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ? ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
and defence policies as well as providing policy options for consideration by the FAC.  
 
dŚĞ &^W ?Ɛ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ to-date remain rather modest and mixed as the European Council on 
Foreign Relations annual EU Foreign Policy Scorecard illustrates.
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 ZĞĐĞŶƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
participation in the Iran nuclear diplomacy process and brokering agreement between the Kosovan 
and Serbian Governments to normalise their relations. Yet these must be set against less positive 
outcomes in Ukraine, Syria and Libya. 
 
Successive British governments have been largely comfortable with the intergovernmental nature of 
the CFSP since its creation. The British Government has assessed its own participation in the CFSP 
positively in the Review of the Balance of Competences exercise undertaken under the 2010-2015 
Coalition Government.
5
 The foreign policy report summarised the expert evidence that it received 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ  “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ƚŽ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ h ŝŶ
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? Proposals to reform the CFSP - such as introducing qualified majority voting for 
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decision-making - have been by successive British administrations irrespective of their political 
composition. Where reforms have been agreed to the CFSP under the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon 
Treaties, Britain has held a consistent position in preserving the central role and veto power of 
memďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞ &^W ďǇ ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
from assuming a leading role in initiating policy proposals, and seeking to improve the effectiveness 
ŽĨƚŚĞ&^WǀŝĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐŽǁŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ and power as a trading bloc. 
 
The EU embarked on its own defence policy in the early 1990s when the member states collectively 
agreed to create a common defence policy. The CSDP, like the CFSP, is an area of intergovernmental 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh ?Ɛmember states. The CSDP has different ambitions and purposes from 
the collective defence purpose of NATO ?  dŚĞ h ?ƐCSDP focuses on preventing, managing and 
resolving conflict using both military and civilian resources. The include providing peace keeping 
forces, providing security for elections to take place in states in conflict, training police, armed forces 
and security personnel in third countries, and monitoring disputed borders, ceasefires and peace 
agreements. The range of roles that the EU and its member states seek to undertake collectively are 
ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘WĞƚĞƌƐďĞƌŐƚĂƐŬƐ ? ?Since 2003, over thirty missions have been launched in Africa, Asia, 
the Middle East, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucuses.
6
 The CSDP is also intended 
to enhance the collective capabilities of member state armed forces by coordinating military 
procurement and enhancing inter-operability by developing joint military forces capable of 
undertaking Petersberg missions. 
 
dŚĞh<ĐĂŶůĂǇĐůĂŝŵƚŽĂŶĞĂƌůǇůĞĂĚŝŶŐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^W ?dŚĞh ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
a defence policy, set out in the TEU, were rather directionless until the 1998 Anglo-French summit in 
St Malo, where Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed to a push for greater EU defence capabilities. 
ƐƚŚĞh ?ƐƚǁŽŵŽƐƚĐĂƉĂďůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞh<-French agreement laid the ground for what 
ǁĂƐƚŽďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞh ?Ɛ^W.  
 
Since this time, the UK has shifted from leader to laggard in terms of its support for the development 
and substantiation of an EU defence policy. Indeed, the CSDP has not been a core component of 
British security and defence planning over the last decade. The SDSR made no reference to the CSDP 
ĂƐĂĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĨŽƌŝƚƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? 
 
Relative to its size the UK has been a very modest contributor to the military strand of the CSDP 
operations (figure 1). It has generally had a preference for commitments through the framework of 
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EdK ? /Ŷ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ? ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ
deployed for roles such as border observation and capacity building for third countries. The civilian 
ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ Ĩŝƚ ƌĞĂĚŝůǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
conflict management, which brings together diplomacy, defence and development resources to 
address the problems of failed and failing states. Independent analysts credit the UK with shaping 
ƚŚĞh ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĂŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂ ?7  
 
The main priority for UK defence and security in recent years has been recalibrating strategic choices 
following the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. A key concern has also been 
ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĨŽƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶ
the context of diminishing public expenditure and the attendant shrinkage of diplomatic and military 
resources. There has also been a growing caution around overseas intervention due to public and 
elite scepticism and weariness. This has not, however, lead to a greater enthusiasm for burden 
sharing on defence or the pooling and sharing of military resources with other member states via the 
EU.  
 
There has, however, been interest in developing bilateral defence relationships with other European 
countries outside the EU. The UK has invested particularly heavily in its relationship with France in 
recent years. The 2010 Lancaster House treaties created a new Anglo-French defence relationship 
rooted in collaboration on nuclear weapons technology and increased interoperability of armed 
forces. The treaties are premised on closer cooperation between the UK and France to facilitate 
greater burden-sharing in the EU and NATO. France has persisted with the idea of Anglo-French 
coordination at the heart of a successful EU foreign, security and defence policy despite the 
reticence of recent British governments in respect of an EU defence policy. It is not yet clear as to 
whether Brexit would reduce the tempo of collaboration.   
 
Foreign, security and defence policy after the Referendum vote 
For the EU the most immediate impact on the foreign, security and defence policy area has been to 
give impetus to ideas on reforming EU defence policy and which have been in circulation for some 
time. A set of proposals have been made for deepening of the existing defence collaboration 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?However, choosing defence as the area to draw attention to 





It is risky because despite being a commitment contained in the Maastricht Treaty that came into 
force in 1993 the achievement of an EU defence and security policy has been modest to-date. The 
CSDP has developed by undertaking a series of civilian and military conflict management missions. 
These have been unexceptional both in terms of their size and the military capabilities required to 
undertaken the missions. The EU has created the 1,500 strong stand-by Battlegroups (composed of 
rotating member state armed forces) to have the capability to intervene swiftly for the purposes of 
managing or stabilising conflicts. These have never been deployed. 
 
A group of member states remain nervous about the EU developing its defence capabilities. This is 
either because of domestic public opposition to deepening EU defence, for example in the Irish 
Republic, or because of concern, expressed publicly by the Baltic states, that the EU should not 
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞEdK ?ƐƌŽůĞ ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?dŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞĚďǇ
the agreement signed between the EU and NATO to broaden and deepen their relationship at 
EdK ?ƐtĂƌƐĂǁ^ƵŵŵŝƚŝŶ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ?8. 
 
A key reason why defence is an attractive area to focus upon is because the UK has vetoed modest 
proposals for the development of the CSDP. The UK has shifted from being a leader, in the late 
1990s, in the development of an EU defence policy to being a much less enthusiastic participant in 
recent years. The UK has not been willing to engage at a level of significant scale and scope with 
CSDP military operations. Further it has been resistant to proposals to further develop the role of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA). The UK has also vetoed the creation of a permanent military EU 
operational headquarters (OHQ) which is supported by a significant proportion of the EU member 
states.  
 
The new initiatives that have been proposed on EU defence are primarily the revival of these 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĂŶĚ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇ ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? dŚĞ ƚǁŽ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŝĚĞĂƐ
have been crystallised into a six-page position paper.
9
 The Franco-German proposals provide further 
impetus to ideas contained within the Eh ?Ɛ ŶĞǁGlobal Strategy10 ? ƵŶǀĞŝůĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ,ŝŐŚ
ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? ƚŽ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƚŚĞh ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?
 
The Franco-German proposals contain components which do represent a significant departure from 
the current EU defence arrangements. The first is to create a permanent OHQ. This is to give the EU 
a greater capacity for the command and control of military missions. Currently the EU uses 
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ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ‘ďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞh< ?ŽƌĨƌŽŵEdK ?
The creation of such an arrangement has been mooted for some time but been a proposition that 
UK governments have firmly resisted. Franco-German paper would also give the EU the command 
centre capacity ĨŽƌĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŵĞĚŝĐĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?Ă ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐĐĞŶƚƌĞ ĨŽƌƐŚĂƌŝŶŐ  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ?ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?
such as air-lift capacities, and sharing satellite reconnaissance data. 
The second is its call for a common budget for military research and for the joint procurement of 
capabilities such as air-lift, satellite, cyber-defence assets and surveillance drones  W all to run under 
the auspices of the EDA. A further idea is that there should be a ramping up of military force 
capabilities available to the EU by using the existing Battlegroups and utilising the Eurocorps which 
already brings together Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Poland in a combined 
force.  
To overcome differences of view on the future for EU defence that exist between the 27 member 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŝƐƚŽƵƚŝůŝƐĞƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƵŶƵƐĞĚ ‘ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
of the EU treaties that allow for smaller groups of EU member states to undertake deeper defence 
collaboration even if all member states do not wish to participate. 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ Dƌ :ƵŶŬĞƌ ?Ɛ  ‘^ƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ? ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ŽŶ  ? ? ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ
demonstrates that thinking in Brussels is aligned with the proposals coming from Berlin and Paris.
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His speech urged the creation to a single operational headquarters, to create common military 
assets (which would be EU-owned), and the creation a budget for defence capabilities (a European 
Defence Fund) to boost research and innovation. Junker also made reference to permanent 
structured cooperation as a vehicle for deeper collaboration.  
The push for a select group of like-minded EU countries to deepen their defence collaboration has 
quickly taken root. The Italian government has proposed an even more ambitious proposal that its 
DĞĨĞŶĐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌZŽďĞƌƚĂWŝŶŽƚƚŝĐĂůůĞĚĂ “^ĐŚĞŶŐĞŶĨŽƌĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?.12 The proposal here is to mimic 
the development of the Schengen travel area which was created outside the EU Treaties by a small 
group of countries, progressively widened to others and then imported wholesale into the EU. Here 
the idea is to create a division-sized European Multinational Force able to act collectively under a 
unified command, with permanent forces in-place and with a common budget to fund its operations. 
If not quite a proposal to create a dedicated European army the Italian proposal, if ever 
implemented, would be the largest and most ambitious European defence integration development 
since the foundation of NATO in 1949. 
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dŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛimmediate response to these proposals has been to threaten their 
enactment while the UK is still a member of the EU.
13
 Such a short term tactic, however, is not a 
replacement for consideration as to what would be best for the long term interests of the UK. As 
with other policy areas the UK government will need to make a determination as to how it envisages 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh ?ƐŽǁŶƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞĂƐ ?
The relatively under-developed and intergovernmental nature of the CSDP does mean that the 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞh<ŝŶĚĞƉĂƌƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂǁŽƵůĚbe marginal.  The UK 
would, however, have a greatly diminished capacity for shaping the future agenda for EU defence 
policy and, as indicated above, EU policy may develop in a direction that the UK views as contrary to 
its interests.  
ǆŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ&^WǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂƌ ƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŽƐƚƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞh< ?dŚĞ&^WĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ
provides significant efficiencies for the UK in addressing a wide range of foreign policy and security 
issues, via a multilateral format, with twenty seven other European countries. It allows the UK to 
amplify national foreign and security policy interests by having these translated into collective 
positions held by twenty eight countries.  
The CFSP decision-making mechanisms allow the UK to resolve inter-state disagreements, and 
ironing-out of differences behind closed doors before pursuing collective positions on issues of 
common concern  W often before they reach international forums. As illustrative the current 
collective EU sanctions regime towards Russia, following its occupation of Crimea and military 
involvement in Eastern Ukraine, provides an example of where significantly divergent views between 
the Member States were directed into stƌŽŶŐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ ƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?
Leaving the EU and exiting the CFSP decision making structures would see the UK looking to 
influence policy from outside. This would be a far more complicated and time consuming 
undertaking than at present. And crucially, the UK would also formally lose its ability to veto the 
development of policy in areas that it would see as contrary to its interests.  
 
The future for the UK-EU foreign, security and defence policy relationship 
In embarking on the process of exiting the EU the UK the future arrangements for cooperation in the 
areas foreign, security and defence policy will need to be negotiated.  Both the UK and the EU and its 
member states will need to take a view as to the characteristics of their future framework for 
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cooperation.  The UK will need to determine the degree to which it wishes to seek autonomy from 
the EU in foreign and security policy-making processes and the extent to which it might envisage 
national policies diverging from the portfolio of existing EU policies. Three alternative scenarios of 
the future foreign, security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU might be 
envisaged: integrated player, associated partner, detached observer. 
 
Integrated player 
At present the EU preserves a foreign policy decision-making system which keeps non-member 
states outside the mechanisms of decision-making. In leaving the EU the UK would no longer be a 
participant in the Foreign Affairs Council, the European Council, Political and Security Committee, its 
working groups and the secure COREU communications network. The UK would also depart the 
collaboration arrangements between member states in third country capitals and centres of 
multilateral diplomacy such as New York and Geneva.  
zĞƚ ?ƚŚĞh<ĐŽƵůĚƐƚŝůůƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ?ǀŝĂĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
policy making infrastructure in the form of EU+1 arrangement for example. This would allow for 
participation in the Foreign Affairs Council for relevant agenda items (and with the precedent for 
participation by the US Secretary of State and UN Secretary General), the work of the PSC and its 
working groups. dŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ŝŶ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
portfolio of foreign security and defence policy.  
KŶƚŚĞ^WƚŚĞh<ŵŝŐŚƚĞŶŐĂŐĞĂ  ‘ƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĞŶŵĂƌŬ ?where it would remain outside the EU but 
inside the CSDP. The UK would continue with its existing commitments to current CSDP military and 
civilian operations, and participate in equal terms in future missions. It would also preserve its 
existing commitment to provide the EU with a Battlegroup and to remain on the roster of 
Battlegroups available for deployment. The UK could also hold associate membership status of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), participate in projects on the current case-by-case basis, be 
ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĐǇ ?Ɛ ^ƚĞĞƌŝŶŐ ŽĂƌĚ ĂŶĚŵĂŬŝŶŐ Ă ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ 
budget. In this arrangement the UK ?Ɛ ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝes would be 









SIPRI Armaments, disarmament and international security Yearbook 2004-2015. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
European External Action Service (2016) CSDP Missions and Operation. Available at: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/    
* Designated lead states are those that either have operational control or contribute the most 
personnel in missions with a military or police component.  
 
Associated partner 
A looser relationship to EU foreign and security policy would be to replicate the relationship that 
already exists between the EU and Norway. This would constitute an arrangement in which the UK 
would align itself with EU foreign policy declarations and actions, such as sanctions, at the invitation 
of the EU. Exchanges on foreign policy issues would be oŶĂ ‘ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ?ďĂƐŝƐĂƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ?ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ
and working group level rather than allowing for direct participation in policy-making.  
dŚĞh<ǁŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞh ?ƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐďƵƚŵĂǇĚĞĐŝĚĞƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ
in aspects of implementation. This could involve the signing of a Framework Participation Agreement 
(FPA) to allow for participation in CSDP operations on a case-by-case basis. The UK could also decide 












2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Number of CSDP Missions and Designated Lead States 2003-2016  
Total number of CSDP missions France as the designated lead state
Germany as the designated lead state UK as the designated lead state
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participation in EDA initiatives but it would lose the ability to determine the strategy of the Agency. 
The UK might also want to consider ongoing permanent participation in an EU Battlegroup, as is 
currently the case with Norway. 
Under an Associated Partner model the UK would relinquish its capacity to have direct influence on 
the development of EU foreign, security and defence policy but seek to involve itself with EU activity 
as an adjunct to a preference for a predominantly UK-centric outlook. 
 
Detached observer 
Under this model the United Kingdom remains politically and organisationally separated from the 
h ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh<ŵŝŐŚƚƐĞĞŝƚƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƌƵŶ
counter to that of EU member states but, rather, makes a determination that it wishes to preserve a 
formally disconnected position vis-à-vis EU foreign and security policies. The UK may have 
preference for privileging bilateral relationships with EU member states and use this as the primary 
route for influencing EU foreign and security policy, rather than seek to influence through existing 
EU third party arrangements. This would provide the UK with the greatest degree of autonomy from, 
but possibly lowest level of influence on, EU foreign and security policy.  
In the CSDP area the UK may decide to follow the practice of the United States. The US has not 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞh ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^WŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐďƵƚŚĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ŝŶĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ^WŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶĂ
case-by-case basis via a framework agreement on crisis management operations signed in 2011. The 
UK may decide to replicate the US in working in separate missions alongside, rather than being 
integrated into, EU military deployments.  
Relationship between the UK and EU may be one of largely corresponding positions on foreign and 
security policy issues - but also with the possibility of divergence in some issue areas. Whether 
divergence might develop into competition between the EU and the UK in third party relationships 
may be dependent on trade-offs that the UK may wish to make in privileging deepening economic 
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EU exit and the alternative forms of trading relationships that might be developed. None of the 
existing relationships that the EU has with a third country or a group of states  W such as the EEA or 
free trade models  W ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐƚŚĞĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh ?ƐĂŶĚh< ?Ɛ
politics and societies that has developed since 1973. As the Brexit negotiations proceed a wider 
range of issues will be up for consideration.  
As an alternative to the current membership relationship the EU and the UK will most likely establish 
a broad-ƌĂŶŐŝŶŐ ‘ĨŝŶĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ŚĞŝƌongoing economic, security 
and political interdependence. It would represent a new style of relationship made by the EU, and 
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might also provide a future model for relations with neighbouring states such as Turkey as an 
alternative arrangement to EU membership.  
The key components of the EU-UK partnership will key issues beyond markets and encompass a 
security relationship. Shared borders and a common neighbourhood will dictate the need for 
working in partnership. Security  W the foreign, security and defence policy component of the 
relationship -  should represent the most straightforward aspect of the future EU-UK  relationship 
that is to be negotiated. Its key benefit is that it ǁŽƵůĚĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇĂůŝŐŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh ?ƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂůůŽǁĨŽr synchronised policy and 
action. 
The key question for the UK and the EU during the Brexit negotiations in the security area is the 
degree to which both sides seek a relationship that see the UK integrated into existing EU decision-
making and collective implementation.  For the UK it is also the degree to which it wishes to 
establish greater autonomy for divergence from the existing portfolio of EU policies. As this article 
suggests there are costs and benefits in differing scenarios for the future foreign, security and 
defence policy relationships between the UK and the EU.  
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